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Previous research on unemployment insurance (UI) has emphasized its disincentive effects for labor
supply, but has largely ignored the insurance benefits provided by this public program.  This paper directly
assesses the consumption smoothing benefits of UI using two different sources of consumption data, the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).  The former survey
provides precise data on employment transitions, but a limited measure of consumption; the latter measures
total consumption, but only has noisy data on employment transitions.  Nevertheless, I find in both surveys that
UI significantly mitigates the consumption drop associated with unemployment.  The extent of consumption
smoothing is larger in the PSID data, however, and the two data sources disagree on whether UI smooths
the consumption of necessities or non-necessities.  While there is a consumption smoothing role for UI, both
sets of results imply that UI is also to a large extent crowding out other sources of insurance against
unemployment spells.  I investigate this crowdout directly, and find that it appears to arise primarily through
reduced wealth accumulation.2
     1A third traditional justification for UI is that it serves as an automatic stabilizer, reducing the severity of
recessions by redistributing from good times to bad.  There is little direct evidence on the automatic
stabilization properties of UI.  A finding that UI smooths consumption at the level of the individual may
provide indirect evidence on its success as an automatic stabilizer.
A major source of income support for unemployed workers in the U.S., as elsewhere in the world,
is publicly-provided unemployment insurance (UI).  At the height of the most recent U.S. recession (1991),
10.2 million workers received unemployment insurance, and the annual cost of the program to the Federal
and state governments was $27 billion.  Research over the past 20 years has provided a very good
understanding of the efficiency consequences of this public income support for the operation of the labor
market.  A long line of work, culminating in Meyer (1989, 1990), has shown that more generous UI benefits
leads to longer unemployment durations among UI recipients.  And Feldstein (1978), Topel (1983), Card and
Levine (1991), and Anderson and Meyer (1993) have found that more imperfect experience rating under UI
has led to excess temporary layoffs by U.S. firms.  
While there is conclusive evidence on the costs of unemployment insurance, however, there is little
evidence on the benefits of the program.  There are two traditional justifications for unemployment insurance.
The first is that it helps to subsidize efficient search by liquidity constrained unemployed workers.  But recent
research has shown that the longer search induced by more generous unemployment insurance benefits does
not result in better job matches, as measured by the ultimate wage received (Meyer, 1989; Woodbury and
Speigelman, 1987).  The second is that it mitigates the fall in consumption of individuals who, due either to
myopia or some capital market failure, are unable to smooth their own consumption during unemployment
spells.  There is little evidence on this second channel for the benefits of unemployment insurance.1
The goal of this paper is to assess those benefits by estimating the effects of UI on consumption
smoothing during periods of joblessness.  This goes directly to the question of benefit adequacy.  The
adequacy of UI is appropriately measured by the extent to which UI allows the unemployed individual to3
maintain her previous level of consumption.  Several past studies have attempted to assess adequacy by
measuring the generosity of UI benefits relative to pre-displacement earnings or consumption (See O'Leary,
1994, and the references therein)  If individuals are myopic, and if they have no access to other forms of
income during their unemployment spell, then this is the appropriate methodology.  If, however, unemployed
individuals are forward looking and can save or borrow, or if they have access to other forms of consumption
insurance, such as savings, borrowing, or the labor supply of other family members, then the replacement rate
itself does not measure the effect of UI on consumption.  This effect will, instead, be a function of how these
other forms of consumption insurance interact with UI.  For example, if UI just crowds out other forms of
private consumption insurance, then it will have no effect on consumption, regardless of the replacement rate.
Measuring benefit adequacy, therefore, requires either information on the net effect of UI generosity on
consumption smoothing among the unemployed, or measures of the extent to which UI crowds out other
forms of consumption insurance.
I attempt to provide both types of evidence in this paper.  First, I  directly estimate the relationship
between consumption changes from unemployment and the level of UI generosity.  I then model the
relationship between UI and other forms of private insurance, and ask whether the results are consistent with
my consumption smoothing findings.  The empirical model used is identified by using differences in UI benefits
eligibility across individuals.  Differences in the benefits available to the unemployed arise from the substantial
variation in the generosity of this state-administered program over states and time over the last 25 years.  This
variation has been exploited before to estimate the effect of UI on firm layoff behavior and worker search
behavior, but has not been applied to assess the benefits of UI.  I build a detailed simulation program of the
structure of the UI system in each state since 1968.  I then apply this program to data on consumption from
two sources.  The first, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), is a longitudinal data set which contains
excellent information on employment histories as well as annual observations on food and housing4
expenditures for the period 1968-1987.  The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) has limited information
on employment changes but high quality quarterly data on all types of consumption for 1979-1991.  The goal
is to use these two sources, with their different advantages and weaknesses, to paint a broad picture of the
effect of UI.  This paper builds on earlier analysis in Gruber (1994), where I found a significant consumption
smoothing effect for food consumption only in the PSID, by examining a variety of different types of
consumption.
To summarize, I find that UI plays a significant consumption smoothing role in both the PSID and the
CEX.  In the PSID, I find that, in the absence of UI, there would be very sizeable falls in expenditures on
necessities such as food and housing.  In the CEX, I find a smaller (but still significant) effect on total
consumption.  Furthermore, this fall in total consumption is driven by changes in spending on non-necessities;
expenditures on food and housing are not very responsive to UI benefits variation in this dataset.  Thus, while
both data sets suggest that there are benefits to increasing UI benefits generosity, the CEX suggests that
these benefits are more limited than does the PSID.  This conclusion, however, is tempered by a number of
problems in defining spells of unemployment in the CEX.  
While there is a consumption smoothing role for UI, both sets of results imply that UI is also to a large
extent crowding out other sources of insurance against unemployment spells.  In the final section of the paper,
I investigate this contention directly, by looking at the interaction of UI and five forms of other insurance: the
labor supply of spouses; transfers from relatives; food stamps; total transfer income; and savings.  I find
evidence of a small crowdout of spousal labor supply and food stamps, and a much larger crowdout of
savings.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  In the first section, I present the theoretical arguments for and
against a consumption smoothing role of unemployment insurance.  In Part II, I discuss previous evidence on
consumption during unemployment.  In Part III, I discuss the PSID data and the empirical specification, and5
present the PSID results.  Part IV does the same with the CEX data.  Part V looks at the interaction between
UI and other forms of insurance.  Part VI concludes.
Part I: Theoretical Background
As noted above, one traditional justification for public unemployment insurance is that it provides a
means of smoothing individual consumption across the risky event of unemployment.  Private unemployment
insurance could provide the same function, but, due to problems such as adverse selection, private
consumption insurance markets for spells of unemployment may not exist.  Individuals can save for
unemployment, but this is less efficient than insuring against such a risky event, since individuals who do not
end up losing their job are inefficiently reducing today's consumption.  Insurance markets overcome this
inefficiency by pooling the risk across individuals who do and do not lose their jobs.  Thus, the provision of
public unemployment insurance may raise welfare by filling the missing market for a state-contingent
payment.  The optimal size of the program will trade off these consumption smoothing gains against the
induced distortions to individual and firm behavior.
A useful starting point for modelling the effects of UI on consumption during unemployment is the
optimal benefits model of Baily (1978).  Baily's two-period model considers individuals who make consumption
and savings decisions in the first period, subject to a level of UI taxes and an exogenous probability of layoff,
and make consumption and duration of unemployment decisions in the second period, subject to a level of UI
benefits.  The individual maximizes:
(1)  V = U[y(1-t) - s] + a*U[y(1-t) + s] + (1-a)*U[yl + s]
where a is the probability of remaining employed, so that (1-a) is the probability of losing the original job.  The
net amount of savings is s.  Earnings on the original job are y, and earnings if the individual becomes
unemployed for some fraction of the second year are:6
     2The fixed unemployment duration (ß) is assumed to be 14.4 weeks, the average in my PSID sample for
those who spend at least one week unemployed.  Allowing duration to be endogenous to the level of benefit
mitigates the consumption smoothing result presented below, since longer duration leads to a lower total
income in the second period, reducing the extent of consumption smoothing.  
(2) yl = (1-ß)(b-c) + ßyn(1-t)
where (1-ß) is the fraction of the year unemployed, b is the unemployment insurance benefit, c is search
costs, and yn is the earnings on the new job.  Unemployment insurance is financed by a tax t.  The model is
closed by a UI budget constraint which sets the aggregate level of benefits and taxes equal:
(3) yt + (1-a)yt + aßynt = a(1-ß)b
This model can readily be used to illustrate the consumption smoothing gains from introducing a public
UI system in the absence of private unemployment insurance.  To do so, I consider the simplified case of
Cobb-Douglas utility, exogenous search behavior with no search costs, and a post-unemployment wage equal
to the pre-unemployment wage (yn=y).2  I first solve the model for the optimal level of savings s*, given the
UI replacement rate.  I then use s* to calculate the effect of increasing UI generosity on consumption
smoothing, defined as the percentage change in consumption from period 1 to period 2 for an individual who
becomes unemployed for ß weeks in period 2.
The results of this calculation are expressed graphically in Figure 1, for probabilities of layoff of 1%,
25%, and 50%.  Each point in Figure 1 represents the percentage fall in consumption for the individual
becoming unemployed.  In each case, there is a sizeable drop in consumption with no unemployment
insurance; for a probability of layoff of 1%, the drop is approximately 20%.  However, introducing public
unemployment insurance mitigates this fall.  This consumption smoothing effect increases with the generosity
of UI, until consumption is unchanged at a 100% replacement rate.  This figure yields the key prediction that
will be tested below: consumption will fall with unemployment in the absence of UI, but this fall will be
mitigated as UI generosity increases. 7
  The consumption smoothing effect of UI shown in this simplified model will be a function of a number
of factors in reality.  One such factor is the extent to which unemployment is anticipated by the worker.  In
Figure 1, as the probability of layoff rises, the initial consumption fall is reduced, and UI has a smaller
consumption smoothing effect.  This is because the efficiency of the savings mechanism increases as
unemployment becomes a more likely event; with perfect certainty, savings is fully efficient and UI has no
effect.  
Another is the nature of the worker's preferences.  For example, if workers are myopic, the
consumption smoothing effects of UI will be larger than those depicted in a model with savings for
unemployment spells.  On the other hand, if individuals are forward looking, as the number of periods of
employment rises relative to the number of periods unemployed, then savings becomes a more efficient
smoothing mechanism and UI will have a smaller effect.  Even in the limit, however, smoothing across the
(relatively) small number of periods of life is inferior to smoothing across a large pool of workers.
Furthermore, even with very forward looking workers, there may be considerable capital market
constraints faced by the worker carrying out her planned lifetime consumption path.  Consider an individual
who faces a known probability of unemployment in one period of a many period life, but the timing of this spell
is unknown.  If the individual can borrow, she can smooth this small consumption fall over her entire lifetime;
public UI will only have a very small consumption smoothing effect through risk-sharing in this case.  If she
cannot borrow, however, then she may not have accumulated sufficient assets to smooth her consumption
during the unemployment spell, and UI may have a much bigger effect.  There is some limited evidence on
the savings behavior of the unemployed in the PSID, which collected information on individual wealth holdings
in 1984.  Among individuals who lost their job between the 1984 and 1985 interviews, only 35% had positive
net liquid assets before the job loss, and only 12.5% had savings of more than 2 months income.  The
comparable figures for those not losing their jobs were 49% and 24%, respectively.8
The final key factor will be the extent of consumption insurance available from other sources.  One
example is the labor supply of family members.  There is a small literature which measures the "added worker
effect" when the primary earner becomes unemployed, but there is little evidence that this response is
quantitatively important (see Cullen and Gruber, 1996, for a literature review).  Furthermore, pooling labor
supply among a small set of family members is once again inefficient relative to pooling the risk of
unemployment across a large number of workers.  Another example is private unemployment insurance
arrangements, such as supplemental unemployment insurance benefits through employers.  But only 5% of
workers worked for employers which offered supplemental unemployment benefits in 1989 (Employee
Benefits Research Institute, 1992), and only 6% of individuals who spent at least one week unemployed
received such benefits in 1988 (author's calculations using data from the March 1989 Current Population
Survey).   
To summarize, the net effect of unemployment insurance generosity on consumption during
unemployment is a function of a variety of factors.  Past research offers only a rudimentary understanding
of each of these factors individually, and little evidence on their interaction.  Thus, the consumption smoothing
effect of UI remains an empirical question.
Part II: Consumption During Unemployment
There is a small literature which documents the effect of unemployment spells on consumption.  The
classic work in the U.S. is Kingston et al. (1978) and Burgess et al. (1981), who evaluated the consumption
change during the first six months of unemployment for a sample of unemployment insurance claimants in
Arizona.  They found that two-thirds of unemployed households reduced their expenditures from the month
prior to job loss to the month prior to the 13th week of unemployment.  The average household reduced its
expenditures by 15.2%, and 40% of households reduced their expenditures by 20% or more.  But these9
expenditure reductions were greatly mitigated by more generous UI benefits.  For those with replacement
rates below 50%, expenditure fell by 30%; for those with replacement rates above 86%, expenditures were
unchanged.  There was also substantial variation in the response of different types of consumption: "necessary
and obligated expenditures" such as those on food and housing fell by 30% for those with replacement rates
below 50%, but these expenditures actually rose by 10% for those with replacement rates above 86%.
These results provide very suggestive evidence that UI plays an important consumption smoothing
role.  But this study has two key weaknesses.  First, the data are for UI claimants only.  Since takeup of UI
benefits is endogenous, it may be that only those unemployed with the most severe spells are availing
themselves of these benefits.  For example, if there is some stigma associated with receipt of UI, then
individuals who face only a short layoff, and thus may only see a small proportionate change in their
consumption, will not takeup UI benefits.  This would lead to an upward bias to the estimated consumption
fall from unemployment.  It will also likely lead to an upward bias to the estimated consumption smoothing
effect of UI.  Since takeup has been shown by Blank and Card (1991) to be a function of benefit levels, it
could be that only those with severe spells takeup UI at low replacement rates, and those with less severe
spells takeup UI at high replacement rates.  This would lead to a bias in favor of finding a consumption
smoothing effect, since high replacement rates would be associated with a smaller consumption fall.
Second, the variation in UI replacement rates is solely driven by differences in ex ante earnings
levels.  These differences may be correlated with other determinants of consumption smoothing, ie. savings
behavior.  In this case, the likely bias is against finding a consumption smoothing effect of UI, since higher
wage earners are more likely to have savings and thus there should be a smaller consumption fall during the
unemployment spell regardless of UI generosity levels.  Since these higher wage earners have a lower
replacement rate, there will be a (spurious) negative association between the replacement rate and
consumption changes.10
     3See Viscusi and Evans (1990) for evidence of the dependence of marginal utility on health states.
Cochrane notes that these are potential problems with his approach; he assumes that the social planner
possesses some extra-market institution through which leisure can be transferred, and that there is not state
dependence.
A similar study of UI claimants was carried out in the U.K., and the results are reported in Heady
and Smyth (1990).  This survey gathered qualitative data on ownership of a number of household durables,
consumption of food and clothing, and the condition of housing.  The authors found that there was little change
in the stock of durables upon unemployment, but that there were significant falls in consumption of necessities
such as food, clothing, and housing.  They do not, however, provide any information on the role that UI played
in smoothing consumption changes.  Furthermore, this study considered only individuals who claimed
unemployment benefits and who were out of work for three months of more, so the type of selection bias
documented above is even more important in this context.
Previous work using food consumption in the PSID includes Shefrin (1987) and Cochrane (1991),
both of whom find that consumption falls significantly during spells of unemployment.  However, neither test
provides a definitive rejection of the null of "full consumption insurance" posed by Cochrane, for two reasons.
First, leisure may rise during spells of unemployment, and if leisure and consumption are substitutes, then
consumption will fall even if there is full insurance.  Second, utility may be state-dependent; that is, even if
leisure is unchanged, the marginal utility of a given level of consumption may be lower when unemployed.3
No test of full consumption insurance which compares consumption across two different states can
convincingly surmount these fundamental identification problems.  Thus, whether there is scope for
consumption smoothing by UI remains an empirical question.
On the other hand, the analysis performed here provides the correct comparative static exercise for
testing for the presence of full consumption insurance.  If such insurance exists, then we should see no effect
of increased UI generosity on consumption smoothing; UI increases should simply crowd out other sources11
     4A test of this nature is carried out by Hausman and Paquette (1987), who measure the consumption
change of involuntary early retirees relative to that of voluntary retirees.  If involuntary retirement is truly
exogenous, then they surmount the state dependence problem by focusing only on individuals who have
retired.  They find a strong relative fall in the consumption of involuntary retirees, rejecting full consumption
insurance along this dimension.
     5Dynarski and Shefrin also include UI benefits received in their model, and they find a positive but
insignificant effect of benefits on consumption changes.  However, as noted above, this test has the
problematic feature that takeup of UI is endogenous.
of consumption insurance.  By examining the effect of changes in UI generosity among workers in the same
state (unemployed), this test controls for state dependence in assessing the extent of consumption insurance.4
Further direct evidence on the role of UI is provided by Hamermesh (1982), who examines whether
the marginal propensity to consume out of UI benefits is equal to the marginal propensity to consume out of
other income.  He takes his rejection of this null as evidence that individuals are liquidity constrained during
unemployment spells, justifying the provision of public unemployment insurance.  His cross-sectional test,
however, is performed by comparing individuals who receive UI to those who do not.  A problem with this
approach is that individuals receiving UI may differ in a number of ways from those not receiving UI, not the
least of which is the fact that they are unemployed.  A stronger test would be to compare two individuals, both
of whom are unemployed, and assess whether increasing the UI available to one, relative to the other,
increases her relative consumption.  This is the spirit of the test carried out below.5
Finally, in earlier work I have examined the effect of variation in UI benefits on consumption changes
during unemployment (Gruber, 1994).  I found that there was a significant consumption smoothing effect of
UI; my estimates implied that the fall in consumption for the typical unemployed person would have been over
three times as large in the absence of UI as it is given average program generosity.  But a potential limitation
of that earlier study was that it only relied on food consumption data in the PSID, which may misstate the total
consumption smoothing effect of unemployment insurance for two reasons.  First, the elasticity of food
demand with respect to short run income shocks might be quite different than the elasticity of demand for12
     6For those with replacement rates below 50%, food consumption fell by 23% and total consumption by
30%; for those with replacement rates above 86%, food consumption rose by 2% and total consumption was
unchanged.  Thus, the effect of increasing the replacement rate on food consumption was smaller than on
total consumption.
     7The other longitudinal data set with consumption information is the Retirement History Survey, which is
used by Hamermesh (1984) and Hausman and Paquette (1987).  However, this survey covers both a shorter
other types of consumption.  Second, even if food and other types of consumption respond commensurately
to changes in income in the short run, there may be differential complementarities between leisure (which is
presumably increasing for the unemployed) and consumption of different good.  This point is highlighted by
Meghir and Weber (1993), who find evidence of a significant difference in the complementarity between
leisure and food consumption versus leisure and other types of consumption.  The resulting bias to the
estimates in Gruber (1994) is unclear ex ante, although the evidence from Burgess et al. (1981) suggests that
there is an understatement of the consumption smoothing effect from using food only.6  So it is clearly
important to move beyond food consumption alone and examine the broader effects of UI on the total
consumption bundle.
Part III: PSID Consumption Analysis
Data
The first set of data to be used for assessing the consumption smoothing effects of UI are the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics.  This longitudinal survey has been carried out continuously since 1968, following
the same sample of families and their "split-offs" over time.  The original sample consisted of a nationally
representative cross-section and a sub-sample of families in poverty; in the analysis below I use both samples
in order to increase the precision of the estimates.
The PSID is the only longitudinal data set available with both information on prime age workers and
measures of consumption.7  This advantage, however, is tempered by the limited nature of the consumption13
time frame (1969-79 only), and collects data only on those from the ages of 58-63 in 1969.
     8The timing of the food expenditure questions is actually unclear; see Gruber (1994) for a detailed
justification of my timing assumption.  
data available.  The primary measure of consumption which has been used in previous research derives from
questions about how much the family "usually" spend on food at home and food away from home.  These food
data have been widely used in tests of the applicability of the life-cycle model of consumption (ie. Hall and
Mishkin, 1982) and the presence of liquidity constraints (Zeldes, 1989; Engelhardt, 1993), as well as in the
papers described above by Dynarski and Shefrin (1987) and Cochrane (1991).  But the limitations of using
food alone, as in Gruber (1994), are described above.
As emphasized by Skinner (1987), however, there is actually a richer variety of consumption data in
the PSID besides food consumption.  In particular, there are two questions on housing consumption: annual
housing expenditures (mortgage payments for owners and rental payments for renters); and whether the
individual is an owner or a renter.  These additional variables can be used to extend my earlier analysis to
housing expenditures.  In the analysis of Burgess et al., housing was the category that adjusted the least to
variations in UI generosity.  So, by examining housing in the PSID, we can hopefully provide a lower bound
on the consumption smoothing effects of UI.
Food consumption is defined as the sum of consumption at home, away, and paid for by food stamps.
I deflate each component of food consumption by the CPI for that component in the month of the interview,
and then sum the real components.  I use a monthly rental cost deflator to deflate mortgage expenditures and
rental payments.  I exclude observations where any element of consumption is imputed, rather than reported
directly by the respondent.  In some specifications, I also trim the outlying 2% of consumption change
observations; this is discussed further below.  All of the consumption questions used refer to the point of the
interview.8  I therefore use employment status at the time of the interview as my key independent variable14
     9Selecting the sample in this way leads to a potential sample selection bias, as previous research (Feldstein
(1978), Topel (1983)) has shown that the probability that an individual is laid off is a function of the
replacement rate.  This is potentially problematic for my approach, if the individuals who are laid off when
replacement rates rise are systematically different from other layoffs.  As I show in Gruber (1994), however,
there is no correlation between inclusion in my sample of unemployed and the level of UI benefits.  This
finding does not contradict the conclusions of the earlier literature, due to the exclusion of temporary layoffs
from the sample.  
in testing for consumption smoothing.
The sample consists of all heads of household for each year of the PSID from 1968-1987.  Data on
food consumption were not gathered in 1973, and data on housing are missing in 1973-1975.  There is one
observation for each person/year in which an individual is employed at the previous interview.  Individuals
are defined as unemployed if they are looking for a new job, but are not on temporary layoff.  Temporary
layoffs are excluded because the information about both probabilities of both layoff and recall to the same
job may be quite different for this population.  As noted with relation to Figure 1, individuals who anticipate
their layoffs may see a smaller consumption smoothing effect of UI, and being on temporary layoff is highly
correlated with recall to the same job and therefore (most likely) with anticipation of the unemployment spell.
In Gruber (1994), I show that the consumption smoothing effect of UI is much smaller for temporary layoffs.
Specification 
My initial specification is run on individuals who are employed at interview date t-1 and unemployed
at interview date t.9    For these individuals, I run regressions of the form:
(4)  ?Ci = a + ß1Xi + ß2UIi + ei
?C is the change in (log) consumption when the individual becomes unemployed, X is a vector of individual
characteristics which may affect the consumption change, and UI measures the replacement rate (ratio of
benefits to wages) for which an individual is eligible.  The hypothesis that UI is having a consumption
smoothing effect is tested by a finding of ß2 > 0.15
     10Other natural candidates for control variables include wealth and the labor supply of other family
members.  However, these variables are potentially endogenous to UI benefit levels.  As shown in Gruber
(1994), the results are robust to the inclusion of state effects and controls for the state/year and county/year
unemployment rate.  The CEX results below are also robust to these controls.  Food needs are calculated by
the PSID by summing age and sex specific food costs for each family member, then adjusting the total by an
equivalence scale for family size.
     11In order to qualify for UI, individuals must have a (state-specific) minimum level of earnings.  To
approximate this eligibility criterion, I drop any observation where weekly wages were below the weekly
minimum UI benefit for that state and year.
The set of exogenous control variables used in the basic specification includes the age, sex, marital
status, race (white, black, other), and education of the head, the number of children in the family, and the
change in the log of the "food needs" of the family, which is a combination of family size and age (calculated
by the PSID).  I also include separate dummies for each year to capture time trends in consumption
changes.10
The key regressor is the UI benefits for which an individual is eligible.  To create this variable, I have
built a simulation program which models each state's UI system for the period 1968-1987.  The basis for this
program is Employment and Training Administration (various years), which reports biannual information on
state benefit schedules.  In addition, it was augmented by information from a number of states and from
Levine (1990).  UI benefits are generally calculated as a function of the individual's highest quarter of
earnings in some base period (ie. last five quarters), along with information on the number of dependents (in
some states).  Since quarterly earnings information is not available, I use the average weekly earnings in the
year preceding the t-1 (employed) observation.  UI benefits are then divided by this weekly earnings variable
to calculate the replacement rate; after tax real wages are also included as a control variable to capture any
spurious correlation between wages and consumption.11
The appropriate measure of the extent of wage replacement must account for the fact that UI
benefits are subsidized by the U.S. tax system.  Before 1979, benefits were not taxed under either the income16
     12The cutoffs were $20,000 for singles and $25,000 for marrieds from 1979-81, and $12,000 for singles
and $18,000 for marrieds from 1982-86.
     13The PSID reports marginal income tax rates for respondents from 1976 onwards.  From 1970-75, the
PSID does not report tax rates, but does report taxes paid; following Zeldes (1989), I use the tax tables for
each of those years, along with information on marital status, to calculate the marginal rate.  For 1968 and
1969, I use information on taxable income, number of dependents, and marital status to calculate the tax rate.
     14This variation reflects differences in both individual characteristics and state/year legislative
environments.  I will present an instrumental variables strategy below for separating these two components
of replacement rate variation.
tax or Social Security tax, while wages were taxed under both, so I multiply the  
replacement rate by:       1     , where t is the income tax rate, and t ss is the social security tax
                            (1-t-t ss) 
rate.  From 1979 through 1986, benefits were subject to income tax above certain income cutoffs,12 so that
the replacement rate is only multiplied by the Social Security adjustment; this was true at all income levels for
1987 onward.  Finally, for those above the Social Security taxable maximum in any given year, there is no
Social Security adjustment.13
The output of the UI benefit simulation model is reported in Table A1, which reports after-tax
replacement rates for each state for 1969, 1979, and 1987, as well as the change from 1969 to 1987 and from
1979 to 1987.  A number of states are missing in the early years, owing to the smaller sample size of the
original PSID cohort.  There is a large amount of variation in UI replacement rates across states and over
time.14  There is a strong secular decline in benefit generosity over this period; on average, after-tax
replacement rates fall by 13.5 percentage points (23.5%).  The decline varies across states, however:
Arkansas saw a decline of 33 percentage points in the average replacement rate from 1969-1987, while the
replacement rate actually rose in Minnesota, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Oregon.
The means and standard deviations of the data set are presented in Table 1, for the full sample of
individuals employed at t-1, those who remain employed, and those who become unemployed.  Those who17
     15The results are slightly different than in my earlier paper, because I trim outliers in a different way.  In
that paper, I excluded any observation with a log change greater than 1.1; here, I exclude the outlying two
percent of observations, which results in a slightly larger sample size.  The sensitivity of the analysis to outliers
is discussed further below.
     16These predictions are not grossly out of sample; 90% of the sample has replacement rates within the
range of 20% to 80%.  
become unemployed have a much lower real wage and consumption level in the previous period (according
to both food and housing consumption), are more likely to be female and black, and are less likely to be highly
educated or married.  Most importantly from the perspective of this paper, unemployment is associated with
an average drop in food consumption of 7.6% and in housing consumption of 4.6%.  Remaining employed has
a small positive effect on food consumption, and a larger positive effect on housing consumption.
Results
The results of estimating equation (4) are presented in Table 2, for several different measures of
consumption.  In the first column, I replicate the food consumption results of Gruber (1994).15  As in that
paper, there is a significant and sizeable positive coefficient on the after-tax replacement rate, indicating that
a 10 percentage point rise in the replacement rate reduces the fall in consumption upon unemployment by
2.71%.  Furthermore, I find that the fall in consumption for those becoming unemployed, at a replacement rate
of zero, is 23.3%.  That is, in the absence of UI, becoming unemployed would be associated with a fall in
consumption over three times as large as the 7.6% average drop reported in Table 1.  But, at a replacement
rate above 86%, UI fully smooths consumption across the unemployment spell.16  
In the second column, I use annual payments for rent and mortgage as the dependent variable.  The
consumption smoothing effect here is even larger than for food, in contrast to the Burgess et al. findings.  The
implied drop in consumption at a zero replacement rate is smaller, however, so that for replacement rates
above 69% housing consumption is actually rising upon unemployment.  18
It is important to note at this point that the implied result that consumption could actually rise if UI
fully replaced previous wages is not an implausible one.  This could arise, for example, if leisure and
consumption were complements, or if there was some other related form of state dependence in consumption.
The third column models the effect of UI on the probability that the individual sells his or her house.
The regression is run as a probit; the implied marginal probability is in square brackets.  The coefficient is
negative, and indicates that every 10 percentage point replacement rate rise lowers the probability of selling
one's house by 0.19%.  The implied probability of selling one's house in the absence of UI is 5%.  The mean
probability of selling for those who become unemployed is only 3%, so the results suggest that the presence
of the UI system lowers the probability of selling by almost one-half.
In Table 3, I explore these measures of consumption in more detail.  I present two results for each
dependent variable: results which drop the outlying 2% of observations (paralleling Table 2), and results which
do not drop outliers.  It is not obvious ex ante whether outliers should be dropped; they may contain real
information on particularly bad outcomes which are affected by the UI system.  On the other hand, data on
consumption changes are notoriously noisy so it would be distressing if the results were driven by several
poorly reported observations.  I report just the coefficient of interest from regressions such as those in Table
2; each coefficient is from a distinct regression.
The first row repeats the analysis of food consumption from Table 2.  In this case, including outliers
significantly increases the consumption smoothing effect of UI, as well as the drop in consumption in the
absence of UI, which is now almost four times as large as the average drop reported in Table 1.  
The next two rows examine the different components of consumption, where food consumed at home
includes food stamps; we present results below where food stamps are excluded.  One hypothesis for the
estimated consumption smoothing role of UI could be that individuals are switching from restaurant meals to
home meals when unemployed, lowering their expenditure on food but maintaining their total level of19
consumption, and that more generous UI simply mitigates this compositional shift.  If this is the case, then the
response of food away from home to unemployment and UI generosity should be much larger than the
response of food at home.  In fact, the estimates for food at home and food away from home are in the same
range, although the coefficient for food away is somewhat larger.  This contradicts the hypothesis that
individuals are simply shifting the site of their consumption.
The next three rows explore the finding for housing consumption in more detail.  For overall housing
consumption, the estimated consumption smoothing effect actually falls somewhat if outliers are included.
The effects on rental payments and mortgage payments are roughly similar; the relative ranking of the
coefficients is dependent on the inclusion of outliers, but in no case are the individual coefficients significant.
The fact that mortgage payments respond as strongly to UI generosity as rental payments may reflect the
negative effect of UI generosity on the probability of selling one's house shown in Table 2.
Thus, to summarize the PSID findings, there is a significant and sizeable consumption smoothing role
for UI.  The findings reported in my earlier work for food are borne out by housing.  The results therefore
suggest that UI plays a very important role in smoothing the consumption of necessities by the unemployed.
Part IV: CEX Analysis 
Data
While the analysis above was able to move beyond food consumption, the consumption data in the
PSID remain quite limited.  Thus, I turn next to broader consumption data in the Consumer Expenditure
Survey.  This survey collects information on households for five consecutive quarters.  Baseline information
on respondents is collected in the first interview, and the remaining four interviews gather information on
several hundred categories of consumption.  In both the second and fifth interviews, information is also
gathered on income and employment, thus offering the potential for a longitudinal aspect to the survey by20
     17Note that the first interview collects only baseline information, so that the second interview is really the
first point at which useful data on consumption is collected.
comparing the results three quarters apart.  Data is available for approximately 5000 families for each year
from 1980 to 1991.  
The advantage of this survey is clearly the richness of detail in measured consumption.  The
disadvantage, however, is that there is not comparable information to the PSID on changes in employment
status.  Information on employment status, weeks worked in the previous year, and earnings are collected in
the second interview, and information on weeks worked in the previous year and earnings are collected in
the fifth interview.17  But there is no information on employment status at the point of the fifth interview,
making it impossible to replicate the PSID analysis.  Furthermore, there are no questions on unemployment
per se; the employment status question in the second interview simply measures whether the individual is
employed or not, and there is no measure of weeks unemployed last year, only weeks worked.
There are two possible solutions to this data deficiency.  The first is to do a cross-sectional analysis
at the point of the second interview, using the question on employment status.  This approach has two
weaknesses, however.  First, a number of the non-working may not be unemployed, but rather out of the labor
force.  Second, UI benefits are a function of pre-unemployment earnings, but I have no information on the
pre-unemployment period.  It is clearly problematic to use earnings from the period when the individual is out
of work to calculate potential UI benefits.
The second solution, which I adopt, is to infer employment changes from the second to fifth interview.
I do so by conditioning on individuals who report themselves at the second interview to be employed and
report working at least 48 weeks in the previous year.  These individuals are then labelled employed at the
fifth interview if they report working at least 48 weeks in the previous year, and they are labelled unemployed
if they report working less than 48 weeks in the previous year.  In this way, I can both measure a change in21
employment status and obtain a pre-unemployment measure of earnings.
This methodology has a number of potential problems.  First, there will be some employment status
transitions which are not the result of unemployment, but other labor force changes.  I minimize this problem
by only including individuals aged 18-64 in my CEX sample.  Nevertheless, while only 3.4% of individuals
became unemployed from 1980-1987 according to my PSID definition, four times as many individuals became
unemployed from 1980-1987 using my CEX definition.  
One means of identifying how many of these individuals were truly unemployed is to look at
information on UI receipt in the last year, which is reported in the fifth interview.  Of those becoming
unemployed by my CEX definition, 23.4% report receiving some UI during the previous year.  In the PSID,
the comparable figure is 39.2%.  So, at most, the CEX results are understated by approximately 40% relative
to the results reported earlier.
Second, there is the sample selection problem noted above: if becoming unemployed is a function of
UI generosity, then more generous benefit levels may affect consumption by changing the composition of the
pool of unemployed.  I noted above that this was not a problem in the PSID.  However, it is more likely to
be problem in the CEX, since my definition hinges on weeks of unemployment, and Meyer (1990) and others
have shown that unemployment durations are dependent on UI benefits.  Indeed, there is a significant positive
relationship between the probability of becoming unemployed (by my definition) in the CEX and the after-tax
replacement rate.  The bias that this imparts to my estimates is not obvious; it is a function of the differences
in consumption behavior of the person induced to become unemployed by generous UI, versus the average
consumption of the otherwise (exogenously) unemployed.  
Finally, there is the problem of mistiming in my consumption data.  I will measure consumption in the
quarter preceding the second and fifth interviews.  While the method used above guarantees that the
individual is employed at the second interview, there is no guarantee that the individual is actually unemployed22
     18State of residence is generally not reported on the CEX, but it was attached by special request to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
     19Note that food consumption excludes alcoholic beverages, which are included in a separate category
below.
at the fifth interview; they could have been unemployed at some other time in the previous year, and
reemployed by the point of the fifth interview.  I have attempted to mitigate this problem by defining
unemployment as working less than 12 weeks in the previous year, which would raise the probability that the
individual was actually unemployed at the fifth interview.  Despite reducing the sample size somewhat, this
had little effect on the results, so I only report the results below using the 48 week cutoff.
The after-tax UI replacement rate is measured in the same manner as in the PSID.18  Tax rates are
calculated using information on individuals' before-tax family income and family structure.  Weekly earnings
before unemployment are calculated as annual earnings divided by weeks worked in the year preceding the
second interview.  The control variables are generally the same as those used in the PSID analysis, except
that change in family food needs was not available, so that change in family size was used instead.
I use a number of different measures of consumption, which are aggregated from the many
categories of consumption reported in the CEX.  In each case, the consumption measure is deflated by the
appropriate CPI deflator for that good in the month of the interview.  The sample consists of household heads
who were included in the survey in both the second and fifth interviews, and who were employed (as defined
above) at the second interview and unemployed at the fifth.
The means for the CEX are reported in Table 4; the quarterly consumption measures have been
converted to annual dollar amounts for comparison to the PSID.  Total consumption in a given year for the
full sample is slightly over $22,000; as in the PSID, consumption in the period before unemployment is lower
for those who become unemployed.  I divide total consumption into consumption of "necessities" (food,19
rental and mortgage payments, and utilities payments) and "non-necessities" (total consumption minus23
necessities).  Note that for those becoming unemployed, prior consumption is slightly tilted towards necessities
(42% of consumption vs. 40% of consumption for those who do not become unemployed).  Annualized food
consumption, not reported here, is approximately $3800 for the full sample, and $3560 for those becoming
unemployed, which matches the PSID numbers in Table 1 quite closely.
The sample differs somewhat from the PSID in demographic composition (more female, less black),
but those becoming unemployed differ from those remaining employed in similar ways (more black, less
education, lower earnings).  The average consumption change among those becoming unemployed is much
lower in the CEX than in the PSID.  The change in non-necessities is larger than the change in necessities,
which suggests that the response of the consumption bundle to short run shocks is similar to the response to
longer run income changes (since the Engel curves for necessities are well-known to be flatter than the Engel
curves for non-necessities).
Results
The CEX regression results for total consumption, necessities, and non-necessities are presented in
Table 5.  The results for total consumption are significant at the 6% level, and suggest that a 10 percentage
point rise in the replacement rate is associated with a 1.3% reduction in the consumption fall upon
unemployment.  The implied consumption fall with a zero replacement rate, 8.8%, is only about 1/3 of the
implied fall in food consumption in the PSID.  As noted above, however, there are a number of reasons to
expect this finding to be lower than that in the PSID, such as the fact that fewer of these transitions are true
moves to unemployment and the fact that the unemployment spell may have ended by the point of the fifth
interview.  Adjusting for the former bias using data on likelihood of UI receipt raises the point estimate on the
replacement rate to 0.218, which is more similar to the estimates from the PSID.
The next two columns suggest that the effect of UI on consumption of non-necessities is much larger24
than the effect on necessities.  For necessities, there is an insignificant effect of UI on consumption, and
virtually no implied fall in consumption in the absence of a UI system.  But for non-necessities, there is a large
consumption smoothing effect, on the same order of magnitude as that uncovered for food consumption in
the PSID. 
In Table 6, I show the results for a variety of categories of consumption, once again both with and
without outliers.  The results for total consumption are stronger once outliers are included; this appears to be
driven by a doubling of the necessities coefficient.  The next row reports the results for food consumption,
which differ dramatically from the PSID; there is only a small and insignificant consumption smoothing effect.
This is somewhat larger when outliers are not excluded, but it remains much below the finding from the PSID.
Furthermore, also in contrast to the PSID, the consumption smoothing effect on food away from home is
much stronger than the effect on food at home.  
The results for rent and mortgage payments, when outliers are excluded, is also quite different from
the PSID.  When outliers are included, however, the results are more in line with the earlier findings.  There
is little effect on expenditures on utilities.
The results for clothing are quite surprising: there is a negative and sizeable coefficient on the after-
tax replacement rate.  The results suggest that consumption of clothing would actually rise in the absence of
UI, but that more generous UI lowers spending on clothing.  This result may reflect a substitution of clothing
for other goods when UI is not generous.  This could be due, for example, to increased job search (thus
requiring new clothes) when UI is less generous.  For car services and parts, there is a positive, and
moderately sizeable (especially if outliers are included) consumption smoothing effect.
The largest smoothing effect of UI is reported in the next two rows, for housing durables and25
     20If the regression is estimated separately for housing services and housing durables, there are large
positive coefficients for both sub-categories.
services, and for entertainment.20  In both cases, there is a coefficient of approximately 0.3.  But there is an
interesting difference between the categories in terms of the implied reaction of consumption in the absence
of UI.  For housing services and durables, there is a large implied fall; excluding outliers, in the absence of
UI consumption would fall by over 37%.  But for entertainment, there is actually an implied  rise in
consumption in the absence of UI, and more generous UI simply serves to further increase consumption.  In
fact, for the average person becoming unemployed, consumption of entertainment services rises by 21%!
This almost certainly reflects a complementarity between this type of consumption and leisure.  
Finally, does UI smooth consumption of "bads" such as alcohol and tobacco?  If much of the effect
of UI was on consumption of such "bads", it could justify a reduction, rather than an increase, in UI
generosity.  In fact, however, there is little effect on alcohol and tobacco consumption from higher UI
replacement rates (although the results without outliers are of the same order of magnitude as for food
consumption).
Thus, the findings in Part III and Part IV offer one general lesson: UI plays a sizeable and significant
role in smoothing the consumption of the unemployed.  The magnitude of this role varies somewhat across
the two data sets.  In the PSID, I estimate that each 10 percentage point rise in the replacement rate
increases consumption by 2.7 percent.  Since Kingston et al. (1978) and Burgess et al. (1981) showed that
the response of food consumption and other consumption to the event of unemployment was quite similar, and
since total consumption per week (calculated from the CEX) almost precisely equals the earnings of the head
per week, this implies that each dollar of UI is converted to 27 cents of increased consumption.  Alternatively,
in the CEX, each dollar of UI is converted to only 13 cents of increased consumption on average; when one
corrects for potential downward bias to the estimates as described above, this estimate rises to 21 cents.  The26
more important difference across the two data sets is in the source of the consumption smoothing, with the
PSID suggesting that it is coming through consumption necessities, and the CEX suggesting that it arises from
consumption non-necessities.  But one important lesson from both data sets is that each dollar of UI is
translated much less than one-for-one into consumption, suggesting a large crowdout of other forms of
insurance against unemployment spells.  In the next section, I therefore directly investigate the interaction
between UI and other forms of insurance.
Part V: UI and Other Forms of Insurance
I focus on five potential sources of insurance for unemployment spells.  The first is the labor supply
of wives (since all of the female heads in our sample are single, the only spouses are wives).  As noted above,
the literature on the "added worker effect" suggests that there is little spousal labor supply response to
unemployment spells.  However, this small response may mask an underlying larger response which is
crowded out by UI, much as the small mean PSID food consumption drop in Table 1 masks the larger
consumption drop which would occur in the absence of UI.  We measure labor supply by the earnings of the
wife.  One problem with this measure, as well as with the other annual dollar measures used below, is
mistiming; unemployment is measured at the point of the interview, while spousal labor supply is measured
for the year preceding the interview.  I therefore use an average of spousal earnings in the year before the
interview and the year of the interview in the analysis; the answers are similar if data from the year before
only are used.  
The second measure of insurance is transfers from relatives.  The third measure is total (non-UI)
transfers, which includes transfers from relatives as well as other government support.  I subtract out UI to
remove an obvious positive bias from more generous benefits eligibility leading to more generous benefits27
     21Before 1977, however, UI receipt is lumped together with workers compensation insurance receipt, so
this measure will subtract out some other transfer income as well. 
receipt.21  The fourth measure focuses directly on one public transfer program: food stamps, a means-tested
program which subsidizes the purchase of food.  The consumption measure used thus far incorporates
consumption paid for by food stamps.  By comparing results with and without food stamps, I can assess the
extent to which food stamps interact with UI in smoothing consumption.  
Finally, I look at the interaction between UI and wealth accumulation.  One form of insurance that
can be crowded out by UI is individual savings.  As noted above, savings is a less efficient means of
insurance than is UI, but it may be the most natural alternative.  The PSID collected data in 1984 and 1989
on wealth holdings of individuals.  I use two measures of wealth: gross financial and net financial wealth.  The
former consists of interest earning assets in banking and other institutions, household equity in stocks and
mutual funds, and other assets such as bonds and checking accounts; the latter subtracts off unsecured debt
from this total.  While the latter is theoretically appropriate, it has the problem that debt holding may indicate
either financial constraint or, alternatively, access to debt markets.  That is, an individual with slightly negative
net assets may be in a better financial situation than one with slightly positive net assets, if the latter person
does not have access to unsecured sources of borrowing while the former does.  
The results are reported in Table 7.  For the measures of insurance which are in changes, I present
the change in the dollar level (rather than log), since many of the observations are zero; the inferences are
similar if logs are used.  For wife's labor supply, there is some evidence of a crowding out effect of UI, but
the estimate is not statistically significant.  As UI is more generous, the wife's earnings increase less, and she
is less likely to go to work.  In order to scale this finding, note that the average person becoming unemployed
has an average weekly wage of $211, so that a 10 percentage point rise in the replacement rate would
increase weekly UI benefits by $21.  This same 10 percentage point rise is implied to lower the wife's annual28
     22Cullen and Gruber (1996) present updated estimates of the effect of UI on spousal labor supply from
the SIPP, and find a more significant crowding out effects.
     23Note that food stamps were not included in the measure of total transfers used in the fourth row of Table
7.
earnings by $25, which amounts to slightly more than one week's incremental rise in the benefits from the 10
percentage point replacement rate rise.  Compared to an average unemployment spell of 14.4 weeks in my
sample (so that total annual benefits would be rising by $302), this is a very small response.22
Transfers from relatives and total transfers, on the other hand, do not appear to be crowded out by
UI.  In fact, total transfers rise as UI gets more generous, although the estimate is not significant.  This rise
could be do to correlations across states between the generosity of UI and of other social insurance programs,
such as workers compensation.  Once again, the magnitude of this coefficient is fairly small, with a 10
percentage point replacement rate increase raising total annual transfers by less than 2 weeks of incremental
UI benefits.  This estimate is also of the same magnitude as the estimate for spousal earnings, suggesting that,
on net, the reactions of these two forms of insurance are cancelling.  
The next row examines the change in food consumption at home, where food stamps have been
excluded.23  Compared to the second row of Table 3, there is a much larger consumption smoothing role for
UI when consumption paid for by food stamps has been excluded.  This suggests that, as UI becomes more
generous, unemployed workers make less use of food stamps in order to smooth consumption.  The effect
in this case is quite large; smoothing of food consumption at home is roughly 50% larger when food stamps
are excluded.  
Finally, in the bottom two rows I examine the effect of UI generosity on savings behavior.  Wealth
data are notoriously noisy, and very large outliers can greatly skew the results.  I therefore use robust
regression techniques which first exclude influential outlying observations, then iterate towards a solution by
downweighting those observations with larger residuals (Hamilton, 1991).  In this case, there is a very29
     24This is only a very rough approximation to the "crowdout" of wealth holdings from UI.  An appropriate
crowdout calculation would involve comparing the reduction in wealth holdings to the expected future stream
of UI payments, factoring in not only payments per unemployment spell but also the likelihood and number
of future spells.  Moreover, such a calculation would incorporate the effective redistribution of the UI system
from high income workers, who are constrained by the benefits maximum and face a lower risk of layoff, to
low income workers, who are bolstered by the minimum and face a higher risk.
significant interaction between UI and this other form of insurance: for every 10 percentage point rise in the
replacement rate, gross savings falls by 0.61% of income, and net savings falls by 0.83% of income. 
At the mean family income in our sample, these estimates imply that wealth accumulation falls by
$174 to $237.  As noted above, a 10 percentage point replacement rate rise for the typical unemployment spell
raises family income by $302.  
Thus, the reduction in wealth from this 10 percentage point replacement rate rise is 58% to 78% as large as
the increase in UI benefits during an unemployment spell.24  These findings, along with similar findings for
SIPP wealth data in Engen and Gruber (1995), is suggestive of an important crowding out role of UI along
the savings dimension.
To summarize, then, we have found mixed evidence on the crowdout role of UI.  There is little
crowdout apparent for spousal labor supply and transfers, but a larger crowdout for food stamps and
particularly for wealth accumulation.  Overall, these results are consistent with the fact that each dollar of
UI is translated to much less than one dollar of increased consumption in both the PSID and the CEX.
Part VI: Conclusions
Traditional analysis of the UI program has ignored the benefits side of the equation in focusing on the
effects of UI on unemployment duration and layoff propensities.  This paper begins to remedy that deficiency
by measuring the consumption smoothing gains from increased UI generosity.  The results from both the
PSID and CEX suggest that there UI has a significant effect on the consumption of the unemployed, rejecting
the notion that there are full private insurance markets for smoothing consumption over this adverse event.30
The estimated magnitude of the coefficient varies somewhat across the datasets, however, with the CEX
implying a much smaller consumption smoothing role.  Perhaps more importantly, the CEX implies that the
consumption smoothing benefits that UI is having is coming through non-necessities, not through necessities
as is found in the PSID.  However, the problems with applying my methodology in the CEX tempers these
conclusions.  Regardless of the data set used, each dollar of UI is translated into much less than one dollar
of increased consumption.  The final section demonstrates that this is because UI is crowding out some other
forms of insurance against unemployment spells, particularly own savings.
What do the findings imply for benefits adequacy?  Both sets of results suggest that measures of
adequacy which simply rely on the replacement rate are badly biased, since there appears to be substantial
crowding out of other forms of consumption insurance for unemployment spells.  Furthermore, according to
the CEX results, the consumption smoothing effects of UI are much larger for non-necessities than for
necessities.  A normative notion of "adequacy" presumably applies more strongly to consumption of
necessities, but the CEX implies that such consumption would barely fall even in the absence of UI.  On the
other hand, both food and housing consumption are affected dramatically by the UI in the PSID.  
More generally, however, the discussion of adequacy raises the important question: adequate relative
to what standard?  As emphasized by Baily (1978) and Gruber (1994), optimal UI benefits can only be
determined through a comparison of the benefits and costs of the program.  Simple calculations using the
PSID data in my earlier work suggest that the benefits are still relatively small compared to the costs.  But
the models in these papers ignore a variety of benefits of UI.  These benefits must be incorporated into a
richer model which can then provide a general framework for comparing the costs and benefits of this
program.Table 1: Means of the PSID Data
All Dollar Values are in 1984 Dollars
Full Sample Remain Employed Become
Unemployed
Food Consumptiont-1 3992
[2036]
4009
[2040]
3507
[1856]
Rent & Mortgaget-1 2831
[2526]
2849
[2543]
2269
[1829]
Age 37.8
[11.8]
38.0
[11.8]
33.9
[10.9]
Female (%) 18.9 18.8 25.5
Married (%) 70.9 71.4 54.6
White (%) 64.4 65.0 48.3
Black (%) 31.9 31.4 47.2
Years of Education 12.2
[3.17]
12.2
[3.18]
11.3
[2.82]
Number of Kids 1.26
[1.37]
1.26
[1.37]
1.23
[1.38]
?Log Family Needs -0.0046
[0.121]
-0.0046
[0.119]
-0.0048
[0.151]
After-tax Previous 
Real Weekly Wage 
286.4
[178.2]
288.9
[178.8]
218.5
[141.8]
? in Employment (%) 3.39 0 100
After-Tax Calculated
Replacement Rate 
0.522
[0.196]
0.520
[0.196]
0.581
[0.166]
? Log Foodt-1,t 0.0054
[0.370]
0.0083
[0.366]
-0.076
[0.456]
? Log Rent & Mortgaget-1,t 0.017
[0.413]
0.019
[0.411]
-0.046
[0.469]
Number of Observations 48514 46870 1644
Notes: Based on author's calculations using PSID.  See text for variable descriptions.Table 2: PSID Regression Results
Dependent Variable is Change in Log Real Consumption
Consumption
Measure
(1)
Food
(2)
Rent & Mort
(3)
Sell?
(Probit)
After-Tax
Replacement Rate
0.271
(0.097)
0.314
(0.113)
-0.400
(0.429)
[-0.019]
Implied Consumption
Fall at 0 RR
-0.233 -0.217 0.050
After-Tax Real 
Wage (*103)
-0.217
(0.360)
 0.478
(0.403)
0.576
(1.478)
Age -0.002
(0.001)
-0.0002
(0.001)
-0.011
(0.006)
Female 0.047
(0.035)
0.071
(0.041)
-0.360
(0.181)
Married 0.012
(0.033)
0.102
(0.038)
-0.192
(0.156)
White 0.101
(0.055)
-0.003
(0.059)
0.468
(0.324)
Black 0.062
(0.055)
0.024
(0.059)
0.231
(0.327)
Years of 
Education
0.004
(0.004)
0.002
(0.005)
0.020
(0.023)
Change in Log
Food Needs
0.210
(0.077)
0.271
(0.094)
-0.787
(0.352)
Number of Kids 0.019
(0.009)
-0.002
(0.010)
0.107
(0.041)
Number of Obs 1644 942 2193
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Sample is those becoming unemployed from period t-1 to period t.
All regressions include 16 year dummies.  Dependent variable is change in log food expenditures in column
(1); change in log rent + mortgage expenditures in column (2); and probability of selling your house in column
(3).  All regressions exclude outliers.Table 3: Outliers and Other Elements of Consumption in the PSID
(1)
Without Outliers
(2)
With Outliers
Food Consumption 0.271
(0.097)
[-0.233]
0.424
(0.118)
[-0.344]
Food at Home
Including Food Stamps
0.233
(0.099)
[-0.183]
0.256
(0.120)
[-0.197]
Food Away from Home 0.388
(0.239)
[-0.401]
0.257
(0.273)
[-0.342]
Rent & Mortgage 0.314
(0.113)
[-0.217]
0.248
(0.137)
[-0.192]
Rent 0.158
(0.113)
[-0.135]
0.195
(0.141)
[-0.176]
Mortgage 0.210
(0.136)
[-0.132]
0.129
(0.206)
[-0.059]
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; implied fall in consumption at a zero replacement rate in square
brackets.  Coefficients are those on the after-tax replacement rate in regressions such as those in Table 2.
Regressions without outliers trim the outlying 2% of observations for each consumption measure, as in Table
2.Table 4: Means of the CEX Data
All Dollar Figures are in 1984 Dollars
Full Sample Remain Employed Become
Unemployed
Total Consumptiont-1 22490
[16825]
23001
[17097]
19235
[14565]
Necessitiest-1
(Food, Rent/Mort, Utilities)
9100
[4733]
9257
[4769]
8099
[4371]
Non-Necessitiest-1
(Remainder of Total)
13390
[14395]
13744
[14679]
11135
[12200]
Age 40.8
[11.0]
40.7
[10.8]
41.4
[10.9]
Female (%) 26.5 25.1 35.6
Married (%) 66.2 66.9 61.6
White (%) 86.4 86.7 84.7
Black (%) 9.9  9.5  12.1
Years of Education 12.0
[4.99]
12.0
[5.00]
11.6
[4.91]
Number of Kids 0.97
[1.20]
0.97
[1.19]
0.93
[1.21]
? Family Size
Previous After-Tax 
Real Weekly Wage
362.2
[315.9]
370.7
[313.0]
307.8
[327.8]
? in Employment (%) 13.6 0 100
After-Tax Calculated
Replacement Rate 
0.449
[0.191]
0.439
[0.189]
0.507
[0.195]
? Log Total t-1,t -0.0051
[0.457]
-0.0027
[0.457]
-0.020
[0.458]
? Log Necessitiest-1,t 0.0008
[0.292]
0.0031
[0.287]
-0.014
[0.322]
? Log Non-Necessitiest-1,t -0.0078
[0.720]
-0.0022
[0.719]
-0.044
[0.728]
Number of Observations 14469 12507 1962
Notes: Based on author's calculations using CEX.  See text for variable descriptions.Table 5: CEX Regression Results
Dependent Variable is Change in Log Real Consumption
Consumption
Measure
(1)
Total
(2)
Necessities
(3)
Non-
Necessities
After-Tax
Replacement Rate
0.131
(0.071)
0.047
(0.049)
0.237
(0.111)
Implied Consumption
Fall at 0 RR
-0.088 -0.038 -0.164
After-Tax Real 
Wage (*103)
-0.023
(0.040)
-0.004
(0.028)
-0.025
(0.064)
Age  0.0002
(0.001)
-0.002 
(0.001)
 0.002 
(0.001)
Female 0.001
(0.026)
-0.011
(0.018)
 0.018
(0.041)
Married 0.012
(0.026)
0.009
(0.020)
0.050
(0.041)
White -0.105
(0.060)
 0.014
(0.042)
-0.231
(0.095)
Black -0.148
(0.066)
0.019
(0.046)
-0.349
(0.106)
Years of 
Education
0.004
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.009
(0.005)
Number of Kids -0.003
(0.009)
-0.008
(0.007)
 0.009
(0.015)
? Family Size 0.054
(0.018)
 0.049
(0.013)
 0.087
(0.029)
Number of Obs 1914 1919 1913
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Sample is those becoming unemployed from period t-1 to period t.
All regressions include 16 year dummies.  Dependent variable is change in log total expenditures in column
(1); change in log necessities (food + rent/mortgage + utilities) in column (2); and log non-necessities (total -
necessities) in column (3).  All regressions exclude outliers.Table 6: Outliers and Other Elements of Consumption in the CEX
Without Outliers With Outliers
Total  0.131
(0.071)
[-0.088]
0.161
(0.081)
[-0.108]
Necessities 0.047
(0.049)
[-0.038]
0.093
(0.056)
[-0.067]
Non-Necessities 0.237
(0.111)
[-0.164]
0.230
(0.126)
[-0.158]
Food 0.045
(0.079)
[-0.076]
0.093
(0.087)
[-0.118]
Food At Home 0.020
(0.082)
[-0.040]
0.022
(0.093)
[-0.052]
Food Away from Home 0.249
(0.158)
[-0.198]
0.268
(0.173)
[-0.232]
Rent & Mortgage 0.039
(0.085)
[-0.033]
0.177
(0.116)
[-0.104]
Utilities 0.038
(0.066)
[0.017]
-0.001
(0.101)
[0.054]
Clothing & Clothing Services -0.220
(0.180)
[0.035]
-0.181
(0.202)
[0.003]
Car Service and Parts 0.119
(0.120)
[-0.120]
0.184
(0.129)
[-0.162]
Housing Durables & Services 0.363
(0.283)
[-0.372]
0.253
(0.296)
[-0.341]
Entertainment 0.310
(0.175)
[0.058]
0.378
(0.197)
[0.029]
Alcohol & Tobacco 0.049
(0.131)
[-0.096]
0.041
(0.149)
[-0.083]
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; implied fall in consumption at a zero replacement rate in square brackets.
Coefficients are those on the after-tax replacement rate in regressions such as those in Table 2.  Regressions withoutoutliers trim the outlying 2% of observations for each consumption measure, as in Table 2.Table 7: UI and Other Forms of Insurance
Dependent Variable (1)
Coefficient on 
Replacement Rate
(2)
Number of Obs
Change in Wife's Earnings -248.7
(308.3)
1822
Change in Transfers from Relatives 72.63
(55.08)
2033
Change in Total Non-UI Transfers 267.5
(187.5)
1974
Change in Food at Home Without
Food Stamps
0.384
(0.127)
1516
Gross Wealth/Income -0.061
(0.012)
6230
Net Wealth/Income -0.083
(0.021)
6230
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Coefficients are those on the after-tax replacement rate in regressions such as
those in Table 2, without controls for change in log food needs.  Regression for food without food stamps trims outlying
2% of observations.  Regressions for wealth over income are run for all persons in 1984 and 1989; other regressions run
for those losing jobs only.Table A1: Replacement Rates Across States and Over Time
St 1969 1979 1987 Change,
69-87
Change,
79-87
AL .686 .563 .357 -.329 -.205
AK .353 .721  .368
AZ .510 .468 .341 -.169 -.127
AR .476 .547 .456 -.019 -.091
CA .586 .486 .352 -.233 -.134
CO .644 .682 .486 -.157 -.196
CT .651 .563 .369 -.283 -.194
DE .681 .534 -.147
DC .672 .714 .582 -.090 -.131
FL .509 .470 .408 -.101 -.062
GA .555 .540 .397 -.158 -.143
HI .590 .424 -.166
ID .315 .361  .046 
IL .573 .560 .390 -.182 -.170
IN .465 .453 .310 -.156 -.143
IA .550 .600 .447 -.102 -.153
KS .528 .580 .494 -.033 -.085
KY .494 .526 .409 -.085 -.117
LA .696 .716 .572 -.124 -.144
ME .478 .553 .434 -.044 -.118
MD .616 .599 .483 -.133 -.116
MA .567 .518 .412 -.155 -.105
MI .619 .480 .442 -.177 -.037
MN .424 .492 .429  .005 -.063
MS .580 .534 .451 -.128 -.083
MO .557 .455 .401 -.156 -.054
MT .528
NE .624 .684 .407 -.217 -.277NV .514 .449 -.065
NH .517 .283 -.233
NJ .564 .466 .456 -.109 -.010
NM .599 .342 -.257
NY .558 .532 .377 -.181 -.155
NC .599 .616 .486 -.113 -.130
ND .379 .620 .629  .250  .008
OH .506 .566 .410 -.096 -.155
OK .417 .500 .457  .040 -.044
OR .469 .488 .483 . 014 -.005
PA .594 .650 .515 -.079 -.135
RI .610 .411 -.198
SC .568 .592 .411 -.157 -.180
SD .488 .493 .347 -.141 -.146
TN .534 .540 .352 -.182 -.187
TX .548 .496 .455 -.093 -.041
UT .493 .582 .415 -.078 -.168
VT .719
VA .545 .557 .392 -.153 -.165
WA .417 .501 .389 -.029 -.112
WV .623 .621 .420 -.203 -.201
WI .575 .612 .426 -.149 -.187
WY .530 .427 -.103
Note: Each cell reports the average after-tax replacement rate for that state/year, calculated using the PSID
data and the simulation program described in the textReferences
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